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Note
Money throughout refers to currency plus adjusted demand and time
deposits of commercial banks held by the public.
Income throughout refers to net national product.
Nominal money or income is money or income in dollars or pounds at
current prices.
Real income or output refers to net national product at constant prices.
Prices refer to the implicit price index obtained by dividing national
product at current prices by national product at constant prices.
Basic data are geometric averages of annual data for cycle phases
(expansions or contractions) that average 2.0 years in length for the
United States and 2.8 years for the United Kingdom.
Rates of change for a phase are generally the slopes of straight lines
fitted to the logarithms of three successive phase averages (the phase in
question, the prior phase, and the following phase).
Demand for Money
1. In the century from the mid-1870s to the mid-1970s, the quantity of
money rose in the United States from the equivalent of eleven weeks'
income to nearly thirty weeks' income but fell in the United Kingdom
from more than thirty weeks' income to twenty-five weeks' income (table
5.2).
2. These contrasting results were produced by
a) Increasing financial sophistication in the United States (particu-
larly before World War I), reflected in a reduction in the fraction of
money held as currency from 33 percent to 12 percent just before World
War I and 11 percent in the mid-1920s (sec. 6.3).
b) Rising real per capita incomes in both the United States and the
United Kingdom. The rise in income raised money holdings in the UnitedPrincipal Empirical Findings
States, expressed in terms of weeks on income, lowered them in the
United Kingdom (see point 4).
c) A more rapid rise in nominal yields on financial and physical
assets in the United Kingdom than in the United States. United States
yields were higher than United Kingdom yields at the outset of the
century but lower at the end (table 5.3).
3. Our data support the theoretical expectation that changes in
population and prices would affect nominal aggregate money holding but
not real per capita money holdings (sec. 6.5).
4. Rising real per capita income had opposite effects on money hold-
ings expressed in terms of weeks of income in the United States and the
United Kingdom. With other variables constant, a 1 percent increase in
real per capita income on the average increases real per capita money
holdings by about 1.1 percent in the United States, by about 0.9 percent
in the United Kingdom (sec. 6.7). Hence rising income raised money
holdings expressed in terms of weeks of income in the United States (i.e.,
lowered monetary velocity) but lowered them in the United Kingdom
(i.e., raised monetary velocity).
5. Aside from the difference in real income elasticity and change in
financial sophistication, not only was the real quantity of money de-
manded affected by the same variables in the two countries during the
century we study, but also those variables had the same quantitative
effect (sec. 6.7). The chief other variables that operated throughout the
period were (1) the differential between the interest return on financial
assets and the interest return on money; (2) the yield on physical assets
(sec. 6.6). In addition, two factors had significant effects for part of the
period in both countries: (3) a delayed adjustment to wartime distur-
bances; (4) an upward shift in demand during the Great Depression and
the Second World War, produced, we conjecture, by greatly increased
uncertainty (sec. 6.4).
7. On the average a one percentage point (not 1 percent) change in the
difference between the yield on financial assets and on money produces
something more than a 9 percent (not percentage point) change in the
opposite direction in the quantity of money. We measured the yield on
financial assets by the short-term interest rate, which in various tests
proved a better variable than an alternative long-term rate. Nothing was
gained by adding a long-term rate as well. However, theoretical consid-
erations suggest that the entire term structure of yields should be rel-
evant. An experiment with United States data supports the theory but
does not increase predictive accuracy of the resulting demand equation
(sec. 6.9).
8. As a proxy for the nominal yield on physical assets we have used the
rate of change of aggregate nominal income. Both theoretical considera-
tions and empirical tests (sec. 6.6.3; sec. 10.3) support the validity of thePrincipal Empirical Findings
proxy as possibly the best available approximation to the average yield on
a broad range of physical assets (including not only those for which there
are corresponding market instruments such as shares of stock or deeds of
possession, but also human capital). On the average, a one percentage
point change in our proxy produces something more than a 0.4 percent
change in the quantity of money demanded in the opposite direction (sec.
6.6.3).
9. The single equation we estimate for the two countries combined
leaves a residual variation to be explained by omitted variables or statis-
tical error of about 5 percent for the level of money demanded, about 1.5
percentage points for the rate of change of the quantity of money de-
manded. The residual variation is approximately the same for the United
States and for the United Kingdom.
10. The simplest of quantity theories, which supposes that the ratio of
nominal money to nominal income is a numerical constant aside from
independent random errors in money and income, supplemented for the
United States by an adjustment for increasing financial sophistication
before World War I, turns out to be an impressive first approximation,
which accounts for well over half the variation in money (if income is
viewed as the independent variable) or in income (if money is viewed as
the independent variable). Allowing for an income elasticity differing
from unity, shift variables, and yields does improve the results. It cuts the
error remaining after allowing for the simple quantity theory by nearly
three-quarters for the level of money (which means, cuts the variance by
less than half) but by only one-quarter for the rates of change of money
(chap. 6, tables 6.6 and 6.14 and equations 26 and 27).
11. For both levels and rates of change, allowing for an income elastic-
ity differing from unity and for the shifts accounts for the bulk of the
reduction in the residual error. Allowing in addition for yields reduces
the residual error for levels by about one-fifth, and that for rates of
change only trivially (chap. 6, tables 6.6 and 6.14 and equations 26 and
27).
Common Financial System
12. The level of velocity in the United States parallels that in the
United Kingdom for most of the century our data cover; and the rates of
change are nearly identical in the two countries (sec. 7.2; chart 7.1; table
7.2).
13. The high correlation between the two countries of velocity and its
rate of change reflects the determination of the demand for money in the
two countries by the same variables (point 5 above) plus the similar
movements in these common determinants. If the movements of the
common determinants had been uncorrelated between the two countries,Principal Empirical Findings
the variance of the differences between the two countries would have
been doubled for levels of velocity and more than quadrupled for rates of
change of velocity (sec. 7.3; table 7.3).
14. The common movements of velocity reflect a unified financial
system in which monetary variables such as prices, interest rates, nominal
income, and stocks of money are constrained to keep largely in step
except as changes in exchange rates alter the number of units of one
country's currency equivalent to one unit of the other country's currency.
However, physical magnitudes are not so constrained. The highest cor-
relation for the two countries is for prices; the lowest, for real per capita
income (table 7.2).
15. Influence ran both ways across the Atlantic, though there is some
evidence that real effects were stronger from the United States to the
United Kingdom and price effects from the United Kingdom to the
United States. Changes in each country affected both nominal income
and prices in the other country (sec. 7.4.2).
16. For nominal income before 1914, the influence of each country on
the other was manifested entirely through its influence on the other
country's quantity of money—the classical specie-flow process. After
1914, that remains true for the United States but not for the United
Kingdom. United Kingdom nominal income, for a given quantity of
money in the United Kingdom, was also affected by changes in United
States money and velocity. We conjecture that the channel of influence
was interest rates. The difference between the United States and the
United Kingdom in channels of influence is something of a puzzle, only
partly explained by the far greater role of the United States after 1914
than before (sec. 7.4.2).
17. For prices throughout the period, the influence of each country on
the other operates not only through effects on the other country's quan-
tity of money but also more directly. To isolate this effect after 1914
requires allowing explicitly for changes in exchange rates (sec. 7.4.2).
This is an expression of the "law of one price."
18. Evidence on how well the "law of one price" holds is provided by
estimates of the purchasing-power-parity exchange rate—the number of
United States dollars that has the same purchasing power as one British
pound. If the "law of one price" held perfectly, the purchasing-power-
parity exchange rate would equal the market rate. Our year-by-year
estimates fluctuate around the market rate, much more closely before the
early 1930s (between plus and minus 10 percent of the market rate) than
afterward (between 10 percent below the market rate and 60 percent
above). Government intervention in the exchange market since the 1930s
has been more potent in disunifying the markets than improvements in
transportation and communication have been in unifying them (sec. 6.8).Principal Empirical Findings
Relation between Nominal Money and Nominal Income
19. The level of nominal income parallels with great fidelity the level
of the nominal quantity of money, and the rate of change of nominal
income parallels the rate of change of the nominal quantity of money.
That is true for both the United States and the United Kingdom and for
the whole of the century our data cover. The largest discrepancies occur
during and just after World War II (sees. 5.2, 5.3; charts 5.2 and 5.4).
This parallelism is a manifestation of the stable demand curve for money
plus the excellence of the simple quantity theory approximation.
20. The fluctuations about the trend tend to be greater in amplitude
for nominal income than for nominal money—in conformance with an
implication of the theoretical analysis of chapter 2 (sec. 5.2; table 5.5).
21. Both nominal money and nominal income are more variable after
1914 than before, and that is equally true for output and prices for both
countries—which we interpret as resulting from the effective end of the
international gold standard (table 5.5).
22. We estimate that measurement error (standard error) in the level
of nominal income is between 2.5 and 4.5 percent; in the rate of change of
nominal income between 0.5 and 0.75 of one percentage point, about the
same for the two countries. We have no comparable estimates for nomi-
nal money or its rate of change (sec. 8.1).
23. Estimates of the temporal reaction pattern of income to a sus-
tained change in the rate of monetary growth, though not firmly deter-
mined statistically, are in general conformance with the pattern suggested
by the theoretical analysis of chapter 2. Generally the pattern involves an
initial overshoot of nominal income, produced by transient effects, then a
highly damped cyclical return to an equilibrium trend (chart 8.1). The
effects take a considerable time, measured in phases, not quarters.
24. Our data are consistent with the theoretical expectation that the
cumulative effect of a 1 percentage point change in monetary growth will
be a 1 percentage point change in the same direction in the rate of
nominal income growth (table 8.6).
The Division of Nominal Income Change between Prices and Output
25. The fraction of nominal income change accounted for by price
change and output change varied greatly over the period. In both coun-
tries, prices had roughly a horizontal trend before 1914 and a generally
rising trend after 1914 (interrupted most drastically by the Great De-
pression). There is no corresponding difference in output, which had a
generally rising trend, at roughly the same rate, throughout the century.
As a result price change accounted for a decidedly larger share of nominal
income change after than before 1914 (table 5.5).8 Principal Empirical Findings
26. The average rate of output rise was greater throughout in the
United States (3.1 percent per year) than in the United Kingdom (1.7
percent per year). The rate of price rise was greater in the United
Kingdom (2.3 percent per year for the century, 3.0 percent after 1914)
than in the United States (1.8 percent per year for the century, 2.1
percent after 1914) (table 5.5; chap. 9).
27. Throughout the period, the level of the nominal quantity of money
per unit of output parallels with great fidelity the level of prices, and the
rate of change of the nominal quantity of money per unit of output
parallels the rate of change of prices. That is true for both the United
States and the United Kingdom and for the whole of the century our data
cover. The largest discrepancies occur during and after World War II
(chap. 5; charts 5.3, panel 3, and 5.6, panel 3). This parallelism reflects
the parallelism of nominal money and nominal income (point 19 above)
plus the greater influence of monetary change on prices than on output.
28. Estimates of the temporal reaction patterns of prices and output to
a sustained change in the rate of monetary growth, though not well
determined statistically, are in general conformance with the pattern
suggested by the theoretical analysis of chapter 2: generally, an initial
overshoot of prices followed by a cyclical reaction pattern, and a cyclical
reaction pattern in output. The price pattern deserves some confidence,
the output pattern very little (chap. 9; chart 9.5).
29. It takes a considerable time, measured in phases, not months or
quarters, before a change in the rate of monetary growth is fully reflected
in prices (point 23 above and sees. 9.3 and 9.6).
30. For United Kingdom peacetime years, there is little if any effect of
monetary change on output. The rate of change of output seems to be a
random series from phase to phase (though not pure white noise because
there is some serial dependence). Its variability is of the same order of
magnitude as would be produced by measurement error (chap. 9, tables
9.10,9.13, 9.14). The results are consistent with a simple quantity theory
that regards price change as determined primarily by monetary change
and output by independent other factors. A sustained 1 percentage point
change in the rate of monetary growth ultimately produces a change of 1
percentage point in the same direction in the rate of price change, but
initially is absorbed partly by a change in velocity in the opposite direc-
tion.
31. For the United States, roughly the same conclusions hold for the
pre-World War I and post-World War II periods with two minor differ-
ences: (1) there is evidence of at least a transitory influence of monetary
factors on output change; (2) output is more variable than prices,
whereas the reverse is true for the United Kingdom (tables 9.10, 9.13,
9.14). However, the dominant influence and ultimately the whole in-
fluence of monetary change is on prices rather than output and, as for the
United Kingdom, a sustained change of 1 percentage point in the rate ofPrincipal Empirical Findings
monetary growth ultimately produces a 1 percentage point change in the
same direction in the rate of price change.
32. For peacetime years for the United Kingdom, and for the United
States excluding the interwar period, price change between cycle phases
tends to be inversely related to output change, rather than positively
related, as seems true within cycles and as is implicit in analysis along
Phillips curve lines. Put differently, the Phillips curve, at least for cycle
phases, seems, if anything, positively, rather than negatively, sloped
(tables 9.1, 9.12; sees. 9.2, 9.7).
33. The interwar period for the United States is idiosyncratic—though
for that very reason both important and instructive. It is the only peace-
time period for either country in which (a) monetary change has a major
influence on output change in the same direction (table 9.1; sees. 9.5,
9.7); (b) price change and output change are positively correlated (table
9.1); (c) most of nominal income change is absorbed by output change
(table 9.6); (d) a Phillips curve is clearly negatively sloped (table 9.13).
34. The idiosyncrasy of the interwar period appears to arise from the
importance of major economic contractions during the period (three in
twenty years: 1920-21,1929-33,1937-38) and to reflect features common
to such major contractions. Traces of the same phenomena appear in the
pre-World War I period at times of major contractions (sec. 9.2). We
concluded in A Monetary History that there is a one-to-one connection
between severe monetary contractions and severe economic contrac-
tions, and that connection seems to dominate the United States interwar
period.
35. The rate of price change (i.e., inflation), given the rate of mone-
tary change, depends systematically on the prior rate of inflation, not at
all (except for the United States interwar period) on the ratio of output to
capacity (sec. 9.7; table 9.13). We use the rate of prior inflation as a proxy
for expectations of inflation.
Interest Rates
36. For the century our data cover taken as a whole, the nominal yield
on short-term nominal assets averaged 4.2 percent for the United States,
3.5 percent for the United Kingdom. The corresponding averages for
long-term assets were 4.8 percent for the United States, 4.2 percent for
the United Kingdom, or a trifle higher than for short-term assets, reflect-
ing the rather small price that borrowers had to pay on the average to get
lenders to sacrifice liquidity (table 10.1).
37. The corresponding real yield on nominal assets, obtained by sub-
tracting the rate of inflation from the nominal yield, averaged for short-
term assets, 2.6 percent for the United States, 0.9 percent for the United
Kingdom; for long-term assets, 3.3 percent for the United States, 1.7
percent for the United Kingdom (table 10.1).10 Principal Empirical Findings
38. On the average for the century as a whole, the yield on physical
assets (as proxied by the rate of change of income) was between the
short-term and long-term yields on nominal assets: nominal yields of 4.5
percent for the United States, 4.2 percent for the United Kingdom; real
yields of 3.0 percent for the United States, 1.6 percent for the United
Kingdom (table 10.1). Apparently, for the century as a whole, there was
effective arbitrage between the yields on nominal and physical assets.
39. For both nominal and real yields, the United States yields are
higher than those in the United Kingdom: by about 0.7 percentage points
for nominal yields, by about twice as much for real yields. The smaller
differential for nominal than for real yields reflects the higher average
inflation in the United Kingdom (table 10.1).
40. For the period as a whole, short- and long-term rates on nominal
assets are highly correlated (correlation coefficient about 0.9 or higher).
In view of the high correlation, and the problem of identifying the holding
period corresponding to long-term yields on nominal assets, our more
detailed analysis of yields on nominal assets is restricted to short rates
only (sec. 10.3). Neither the short- nor the long-term rate on nominal
assets is highly correlated with the yield on physical assets (table 10.1).
41. The rough equality of yields on nominal and physical assets for the
century as a whole does not hold for subperiods classified by the behavior
of prices. The yield on physical assets tends to exceed the yield on
nominal assets in periods of rising prices, to be less than the yield on
nominal assets in periods of falling prices.
42. The data for all subperiods before World War II behave as if prices
were expected to be stable and both inflation and deflation were unantici-
pated: nominal yields on nominal assets average much the same in
periods of rising and falling prices; real yields on nominal assets are low in
periods of rising prices and high in periods of falling prices. On the other
hand, nominal yields on physical assets are high in periods of rising
prices, low in periods of falling prices; real yields on physical assets are
much the same in periods of falling and rising prices. These results for
physical assets do not represent successful prediction of inflation. Rather,
the receipts from the use of physical assets and the costs of operating
them adjust more or less automatically to the contemporaneous rate of
inflation or deflation, and hence produce the equivalent of automatic
indexing in respect of their yields (table 10.3).
43. The failure of the nominal yield on nominal assets to adjust to
inflation or deflation before World War II confirms the general concep-
tion that inflation benefits debtors and harms creditors, whereas deflation
benefits creditors and harms debtors. However, the evidence does not
confirm a related conception: that such transfers of wealth make deflation
adverse to growth and inflation favorable to growth. The clearest com-
parison is between the period of falling prices before 1896 and of rising11 Principal Empirical Findings
prices from 1896 to World War I. For both the United States and the
United Kingdom, output grew somewhat more rapidly in the earlier
period of deflation than in the later period of inflation (sec. 10.4.2).
44. After World War II, the financial markets began to behave dif-
ferently. Beginning in the 1960s, there is a gradual shift, in both the
United States and the United Kingdom, from the prior pattern to one
involving anticipation of inflation: interest rates start to parallel rates of
inflation, so nominal returns on nominal assets become more variable,
and real returns on nominal assets become less variable.
45. We estimate from the subperiod data for both countries that, on
the average, asset holders preferred physical to nominal assets, being
willing to accept a 1.25 percentage point lower yield on physical than on
nominal assets (sec. 10.4.2).
46. The differential between United States and United Kingdom
yields on nominal assets also varies considerably among subperiods. (a) It
was highest before 1896, when the fear of inflation, despite the fact of
deflation, kept United States rates high (they averaged 2.5 percentage
points higher than United Kingdom rates), (b) The differential was about
one percentage point lower from 1896 to 1914, when confidence in the
stability of the currency kept United States rates low despite the fact of
inflation, (c) It declined another percentage point (to about 0.5 percent-
age points) from the pre-World War I period to the interwar period as a
result of a decline of about that magnitude in the excess of the yield on
physical capital in the United States over the yield in the United King-
dom, (d) It fell another two percentage points (to —1.5 percentage
points) from the interwar to the post-World War II period as a result of
greater inflation in the United Kingdom than in the United States and an
accompanying depreciation of the pound sterling (table 10.4; sec.
10.4.1).
47. Our results strongly support the doubts expressed by Frederick
Macaulay more than forty years ago about the universality of the "Gib-
son paradox"—a positive correlation between interest rates and price
levels (not rates of price change). Such a correlation does hold for the
United States and the United Kingdom before World War I; it does not
hold over periods witnessing a substantial shift in the price level; it holds
in much-muted form between the wars; it is hardly evident at all for the
period after World War II (chart 10.18; table 10.6; sec. 10.6).
48. The more restricted "Gibson phenomenon" (hardly a "paradox")
can plausibly be explained along the lines suggested by Irving Fisher: a
relation between interest rates and the anticipated rate of price change,
where anticipations are formed by extrapolating a fairly long series of
past price changes, plus allowance for such episodic phenomena as the
free silver movement in the United States in the 1880s and the 1890s (sec.
10.7.1).12 Principal Empirical Findings
49. Our estimate of the period of price change entering into the
formation of price anticipations is some six to nine years, distinctly
shorter than the period estimated by Fisher and others (table 10.8; sec.
10.7.1).
50. Our data reject the Wicksell-Keynes explanation that the positive
correlation between interest rates and the price level reflects fluctuations
in the real yield on capital, transmitted to both prices and nominal
interest rates through commercial banks, which delay the impact of
changes in real yields on nominal rates by altering the quantity of money
(sec. 10.7.2).
Long Swings
51. For the United States, the long swings in money, nominal income,
and real income that remain after lengthening the period used to compute
rates of change from three successive phases to nine phases are members
of the same species as those studied by Kuznets, Burns, Abramovitz, and
others. For the United Kingdom, it is dubious that there are any long
swings in our series except those that reflect the smoothing of the two
wars, plus possibly a post-World War II upsurge. This corresponds with
the difficulty that investigators of long swings have had in demonstrating
their existence in the United Kingdom (sec. 11.1; chart 11.1).
52. For the United States, the swings in money and nominal income
are decidedly larger in amplitude than in real income. Yet the extensive
literature on long swings hardly mentions money.
53. The evidence from our data suggests (a) that money has played a
major role in the United States long swings identified in the long-swing
literature; (b) that wars and major deep depressions have been the major
source of wide variability in money, nominal income, prices, and real
income. These findings suggest that the empirically observed swings
reflect not a self-generating cyclical process but rather episodic phe-
nomena smoothed both by the economic reaction to them and by the
statistical treatment of the economic data. This episodic interpretation is
consistent with the apparent absence of long swings in the United King-
dom, since the absence can be explained by the relative unimportance of
deep depressions in the United Kingdom.